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Abstract—The use of Machine Learning (ML) techniques in
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) has taken a prominent role in
the network security management field, due to the substantial
number of sophisticated attacks that often pass undetected
through classic IDSs. These are typically aimed at recognizing
attacks based on a specific signature, or at detecting anomalous
events. However, deterministic, rule-based methods often fail to
differentiate particular (rarer) network conditions (as in peak
traffic during specific network situations) from actual cyber
attacks. In this paper we provide an experimental-based review
of neural-based methods applied to intrusion detection issues.
Specifically, we i) offer a complete view of the most promi-
nent neural-based techniques relevant to intrusion detection,
including deep-based approaches or weightless neural networks,
which feature surprising outcomes; ii) evaluate novel datasets
(updated w.r.t. the obsolete KDD99 set) through a designed-from-
scratch Python-based routine; iii) perform experimental analyses
including time complexity and performance (accuracy and F-
measure), considering both single-class and multi-class problems,
and identifying trade-offs between resource consumption and
performance. Our evaluation quantifies the value of neural
networks, particularly when state-of-the-art datasets are used to
train the models. This leads to interesting guidelines for security
managers and computer network practitioners who are looking
at the incorporation of neural-based ML into IDS.
Index Terms—Network Intrusion Detection, Neural Networks,
Deep Learning, Network and Security Management
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, the adoption of Machine Learning
(ML) techniques to the field of network security has become
prominent [1], [2]. This is mainly due to the possibility of
tackling a range of ever more sophisticated attacks able to cir-
cumvent security-based systems which rely on classic features
inspection (e.g. port-control, signature-based flow detection,
IPs black-listing, etc.). It is useful to recall that, especially in
encrypted traffic analysis, the difference between deterministic
and stochastic features is crucial. Deterministic ones pertains
to “static” information embodied in security protocols such
as TLS (e.g. record length, handshake types, cipher suites,
etc.) [3], or IPSec (ISAKMP SPI Initiator/Responder, payload
length, etc. ). On the other hand, stochastic features exploit the
probabilistic nature (hard to hide in encrypted flows as well) of
some traffic characteristics (e.g. the distribution of inter-arrival
times). On behalf of ML-based techniques, it becomes quite
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straightforward to manage stochastic features which, coupled
with the deterministic ones, allow to characterize as accurately
as possible an encrypted data flow.
Moreover, new network intrusion detection systems (NIDS)
[4], [5] can actually interact with ML-based engines in order
to learn the statistical features that characterize the various
traffic flows and, in turn, classify them according to spe-
cific performance/time efficiency trade-offs. Among various
possibilities of interaction, the Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMP) offers a flexible and standardized way to
collect traffic data from a number of agents, by relying on
Management Information Base (MIB) objects which provide
information about some features to be managed [6]–[8].
This notwithstanding, one of the biggest problems is to
deal with the jungle of ML techniques which, depending
on the underlying strategy, can exhibit completely different
performance when applied in the intrusion detection field.
In fact, most attempts at surveying ML-based traffic clas-
sification problems have resulted in non-homogeneous com-
parisons and often unfair outcomes. Another flaw found in
existing literature concerns the choice of a valid dataset. Most
of studies, in fact, rely on the obsolete KDD99 dataset [9],
or its evolved version NSL-KDD [10]. These datasets either
do not contemplate essential features of modern data traffic
(e.g. voice, video), or contain outdated signatures of network
attacks [11].
In this paper we address the aforementioned shortcomings,
providing the following main contributions. i) We survey
neural-based techniques, which have recently taken promi-
nence thanks to deep-based methods, in the specific context of
traffic classification problems; we provide a critical compari-
son of algorithms that share a common paradigm (e.g. deep
neural networks, linear vector quantization, etc.), including
also techniques that are not typically applied to intrusion de-
tection, such as weightless neural networks, whose results are
quite unexpected. ii) We go beyond a traditional survey, pro-
viding an experimental-based assessment; we take into account
novel traffic datasets (such as CIC-IDS-2017/2018), where
both single-class cases (namely benign vs. malign) and multi-
class cases (namely benign vs. malign1 ... vs. malignk) are
considered; we perform both performance analysis (through
accuracy/F-measure figures) and time-complexity analysis.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents an
excursus of related literature and, by means of a comparative
table, we highlight differences and commonalities with other
surveys. In Sect. III we review the most credited neural-
based methods. Section IV presents details about the novel
considered datasets, where traffic features are grouped ac-
cording to a similarity criterion. In Sect. V we provide an
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2experimental-based comparison, where different neural-based
techniques are juxtaposed through performance and time-
complexity analyses. Finally, Section VI concludes this work
by also indicating some promising research directions.
II. RELATED WORK ON ML TECHNIQUES APPLIED TO
NETWORK INTRUSION DETECTION
ML-based intrusion detection is becoming attractive for a
variety of network environments including service providers
[12], sensor networks [13], Internet of Things [14], and
automotive [15]. This notwithstanding, a great part of scientific
literature, which faces the problem of data traffic classification
through machine learning techniques, suffers from the datasets
obsolescence issue. For many years, the only dataset available
to the scientific community was the so-called KDD99, which
is still broadly used today to validate ML-based algorithms
and techniques when dealing with traffic classification prob-
lems. Unfortunately, this is an outdated 20-years-old dataset
involving network attacks that have already been mitigated.
An example is satan probing, an attack aimed at probing a
computer for security loophole, based on the satan tool that
was created at the end of the 1990s, but is today no longer
documented as a Web page.
Other examples include: warezmaster/warezclient, which
exploits some old vulnerabilities of the anonymous FTP pro-
tocol, and smurf attacks, aimed at attaining default router
settings that allowed directed broadcasts. Yet, currently, router
vendors simply deactivate this functionality. An ameliorated
version of KDD99 is known as NSL-KDD. However, despite
providing some improvements (e.g. no redundant records, bet-
ter balancing between training and test set), NSL-KDD is still
not taking into account crucial information that characterizes
novel cyber attacks.
This notwithstanding, both KDD99 and NSL-KDD datasets
are still broadly used to test some functionalities of NIDS
systems that implement neural-based techniques. For instance,
in [16]–[18] the authors show the effectiveness of using an
NIDS in conjunction with an artificial neural network (ANN)
to improve the quality of traffic detection, where a validation
stage onto the KDD99 dataset is performed. A deep learning
approach is used in [19], based on KDD99, to verify accuracy
against an SVM methodology. A novel approach based on
ANN (referred to as self-taught learning) is applied in [20] to
enable an NIDS to detect previously unseen attacks via recon-
structions made on unlabeled data. This work provides tests
on both KDD99 and NSL-KDD. In [21] and [22] the authors
adopt neural-based methods exploiting Self-Organizing Maps.
In [23] and [24], Learning Vector Quantization is coupled with
SVM and k-Nearest Neighbor, respectively, to detect traffic
anomalies. In [25]–[28] deep neural networks concepts are
applied to intrusion detection systems.
The KDD99 and NSL-KDD datasets have also been used
to test a variety of non neural-based techniques such as Sup-
port Vector Machine [29]–[33], Principal Component Analysis
[34]–[38], Decision Trees [39]–[42], [42], [43], and various
unsupervised approaches [44]–[49].
By contrast to the aforementioned works, some recent
datasets are emerging from new testbeds which adhere more
strictly to real-world network scenarios. For instance, the
Cyber Range Lab of the Australian Centre for Cyber Security
provides two recent datasets: the UNSW-NB15 dataset [50]
which includes a mix of legitimate network activities and
synthetic attacks, and the Bot-IoT dataset [51] which embeds
normal and simulated network traffic gathered in an IoT-
compliant testbed, along with various types of attacks.
Again, the datasets recently released by the Canadian Insti-
tute for Cybersecurity (CIC) [52] represent the state-of-the-art,
in terms of both complexity and novelty of network attacks.
These datasets have been created starting from an experimental
testbed under controlled conditions [11], whereby an attack
network (including a router, a switch, and four PCs equipped
with Kali Linux OS, which is a popular Linux distribution
to perform penetration testing) is counterposed to a victim
network (including routers, firewalls, switches, and various
PCs equipped with Windows, Linux, and MacOS operating
systems). An evolved version of this testbed has been designed
to run on Amazon AWS [53]. In this case, the attacking
infrastructure includes 50 PCs, and the victim network in-
cludes 420 PCs and 30 servers. The implemented attacks
encompass Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), Portscan,
Bruteforce, along with some typical Android-based network
attacks injecting malicious codes such as adwares, malwares,
and ransomwares.
The interest for such novel datasets is proven by novel
works as detailed in the following. In [54], authors validate an
artificial neural network system onto a CIC-released dataset to
detect the malicious traffic generated by a botnet, out of the
regular traffic. A hybrid neural network to detect anomalies
in network traffic is proposed in [55], where the CIC-IDS-
2017 dataset has been exploited. Specifically focused on DDoS
detection is the work in [56], where a neural-based approach
relying on the implementation of a simple Multi-Layer Per-
ceptron is contrasted to the Random Forest technique. Again
focused on DDoS detection is [57], where some classic ML-
based techniques (e.g. Naı¨ve Bayes and Logistic Regression)
are used to distinguish regular traffic from malicious one.
Going more precisely into the set of papers that share with
the proposed work the purpose of surveying and/or comparing
ML techniques for intrusion detection, we have gathered the
prominent papers in Table I. The first column contains a
pointer to the source; the second column reports the type of
experimental analysis (if any); the third column highlights the
type of datasets utilized (single/multi-class); the last column
provides a brief description of the surveyed material, whereby
the qualification “non-homogeneous” refers to a comparison
among techniques belonging to different families, thus, hardly
comparable.
Going beyond the adoption of novel datasets, we want to
highlight the two most significant differences arising between
the proposed review and the technical literature: First, to
avoid dispersions, we prefer to focus on a specific fam-
ily of ML techniques, namely the neural networks, so to
guarantee more fair comparisons among outcomes. Such a
focus allows us to better reveal the surprising behavior of
weightless neural networks (traditionally exploited in the field
of image classification) which exhibits an extraordinary advan-
3TABLE I: Prominent Related Work surveying ML techniques applied to Network Intrusion Detection.
Authors Experiments Single/Multi Class Description
Nguyen et al. [58] N/A N/A Classic survey on ML-based techniques with
pointers to other works but with no experi-
ments.
Boutaba et al. [59] N/A N/A Survey on ML-based techniques applied to var-
ious networking-related problems (from traffic
classification to routing or QoS/QoE manage-
ment).
Hindy et al. [60] N/A N/A Survey on IDS techniques taking into account
ML algorithms such as ANN, K-means and
SVM.
Khraisat et al. [61] N/A N/A Survey on Signature and Anomaly-based IDS
techniques applying ML methods on NSL-
KDD dataset.
Aldweesh et al. [62] N/A N/A Survey on Deep Learning techniques for IDSs
with pointers to other works but with no ex-
periments.
Fernandes et al. [63] N/A N/A Survey on various techniques (ML, Statistical,
Information Theory) for intrusion detection
with pointers to other works but with no ex-
periments.
Buczak et al. [64] N/A N/A Survey on Data Mining and ML methods for
intrusion detection with pointers to other works
but with no experiments.
Tidjon et al. [65] N/A N/A Survey on various techniques (mainly ML-
based) to be applied in intrusion detections
with pointers to other works but with no ex-
periments.
Azwar et al. [66] Performance analysis Single Class Non-homogeneous comparisons among vari-
ous approaches (trees, NN) by using modern
CIC-IDS17 dataset.
Moustafa et al. [67] Performance analysis Single Class Holistic Survey on ML methods with experi-
ments on feature reduction techniques (ARM,
PCA, ICA).
Meena et al. [68] Time analysis Single Class Non-homogeneous comparisons between J48
and Naı¨ve Bayes techniques on KDD and
NSL-KDD datasets.
Rama et al. [69] Performance analysis,
Time analysis (partial)
Single Class Non-homogeneous comparisons among vari-
ous algorithms (e.g. J48, Naı¨ve Bayes, Bag-
ging) on KDD and NSL-KDD datasets.
Yin et al. [70] Performance analysis Single/Multi Class Non-homogeneous comparisons among vari-
ous and different approaches (e.g. J48, ANN,
SVM) on KDD99 dataset.
This work Performance analysis,
Time analysis
Single/Multi Class Homogeneous comparisons among neural-
based approaches (Deep, Weightless NN,
LVQ, SOM) performed on modern CIC-IDS-
2017/2018 datasets.
tageous accuracy/time complexity trade-off w.r.t. other NN-
based methods. Then, we carry out an experimental analysis
including performance and time complexity (this latter of-
ten neglected in technical literature) about all the described
NN techniques; this effort overcomes the limit of gathering
findings from various works (where different authors exploit
different testbeds exhibiting different performance), thus, it
results in a uniform vision of neural methods in the field
of intrusion detection. Accordingly, Table I helps pinpointing
such novel aspects of the present paper, as per last row.
III. NEURAL-BASED TECHNIQUES UNDER SCRUTINY
In this section we offer a brief recap of neural-based
techniques that we then employ in Section V to perform our
comparative assessment. We start with Multi-Layer Perceptron
(MLP) which represents the basis for implementing ANNs and
deep neural networks (DNN). Then, we consider WiSARD,
one of the most representative algorithms of weightless neural
networks. These typically provide interesting performance
results, but have traditionally been applied in domains such
as image classification rather than intrusion detection. We
4examine Learning Vector Quantization (LVQ) methods (with
3 variants), where the notion of codebook vector will be
introduced. Finally, we take into account the Self-Organizing
Maps (SOM) technique.
A. Multi-Layer Perceptron
The Multilayer Perceptron is one of the most representative
type of feedforward-based ANNs, whereby there are no cycles
arising in the connections among nodes. MLPs exhibit a fully
connected structure of neurons, where each individual neuron
calculates the weighted sum of n inputs, adds a bias term b,
and then applies an activation function φ(·) to produce the
output s, namely
s = φ
(
n∑
i=1
wi xi + b
)
. (1)
Figure 1 depicts i) (left panel) the model of a single neuron
(or single-unit perceptron) implementing (1), and ii) (middle
panel) a simplified structure of a typical MLP model with
5 neurons in the input layer, 3 neurons in the hidden layer,
and 1 neuron in the output layer. In case of multiple hidden
layers, MLP implements a Deep Neural Network (DNN) [71]
as reported in the right panel.
The basic MLP functioning is described next. Input In (see
Fig. 1 - middle panel) activates the hidden layer (or layers)
by following the forward activation direction, which is what
justifies the term feed-forwarding neural network. Similarly,
neurons in the hidden layers feed forward into output neurons,
thus, an output value is obtained. It is useful to recall that
the activation function is aimed at deciding whether or not a
neuron would be activated, introducing some non-linearity into
the neuron output. A variety of activation functions exist [72]
including: step function, linear, sigmoid, hyperbolic tangent,
ReLU (Rectified Linear Unit), Softmax and many others.
The MLP training stage is achieved through backpropa-
gation, a mechanism exploited to adjust weights of neurons
aimed at progressively minimizing the error through Gradient
Descent (GD), an iterative optimization algorithm useful to
find local minima. Precisely, the purpose is to minimize an
error function (e.g. least squares):
E =
∑
p∈P
| |tp − sp | |2, (2)
where P is the set of training patterns, tp is the target, and sp
is the output for the example pattern p. The weight-updating
rule, used to progressively compute the new weight wnew , is
derived by evaluating the gradient ∂E/∂w, so that:
wnew = w + ∆w,
∆w = −η ∂E
∂w
+ α∆wprev, (3)
where: i) η is the learning rate, namely a hyperparameter
lying in the range (0, 1) associated to the step size of the GD
procedure (N.B.: too small η implies difficulty of convergence,
whereas too large η could result in indefinite oscillations);
ii) α is defined as the momentum, a term lying in the range
(0, 1) used to weight the influence of each iteration. It is
worth noting that, since derivative operations are involved in
the backpropagation algorithm, non-linear activation functions
(e.g. Sigmoid, ReLU) have to be exploited, whose derivative
functions exist and are finite.
In our MLP-based experiment we use two types of activa-
tion functions: ReLU for all the layers except for the output,
and Softmax for the neurons in the output layer. ReLU has
been proven to be one of the most effective activation functions
when dealing with deep neural networks [73], [74] since it
allows the whole network to converge rapidly. Conversely,
Softmax is particularly suited for handling multiple classes
in the output stage [75].
B. Evolved Deep architectures
Deep learning approaches allow to face a problem in a
hierarchical way. Lower layers of the model are associated
to a basic representation of the problem, whereas higher
layers encode more complex aspects. Inputs feeding each
layer of a DNN are manipulated through transformations
which are parametrized by a number of weights. Although
deep approaches are very promising, two main issues remain
opened: first, training these architectures requires a significant
computational power, and, then, the huge number of hyperpa-
rameters makes the tuning process very hard. In the following,
we briefly discuss the most recent architectures relying on a
deep-based approach.
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs): Such a tech-
nique [76] takes inspiration from the human visual cortex,
which embodies areas of cells responsive to particular regions
of the visual field. This structure makes CNNs exceptionally
suited for applications such as images classification or objects
detection. Two main stages characterize the CNN lifecycle:
feature extraction and classification. In the first stage, the so-
called convolutional filters extract multiple features from the
input and encode them in feature maps. The “convolution”
is the mathematical operation consisting in an element-wise
product and sum between two matrices, and has the main
drawback of being hugely time consuming. The output of each
convolutional layer feeds the activation function layer (e.g.
ReLU) which produces an activation map by starting from
a feature map. Finally, an optional pooling layer keeps only
significant data. On the other hand, the classification stage is
composed of a number of fully connected (or dense) layers
followed by a Softmax output layer.
Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs): It is a class of DNNs
conceived on the basis of a work of Rumelhart [77], explicitly
designed to deal with sequential data. Thus, RNNs are well
suited for modelling language (intended as a sequence of
interconnected words) in the field of the so-called natural
language processing (NLP). The key concept in RNNs is
the presence of cycles, which represent the internal memory
exploited to evaluate current data with respect to the past. Such
a temporal dependency calls for the introduction of time-based
hidden states obeying to:
h(t) = φ(h(t − 1), x(t)), (4)
5x2 w2 Σ φ
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Fig. 1: Single Neuron model (left panel). MLP model (middle panel). Deep NN model (right panel)
.
with the meaning that an internal state h at time t can be
represented in terms of the input at time t and the previous
hidden state at time t − 1. In this way, an RNN is helpful to
predict the next element of a time series, or the next word in
a sentence based on the number of the previous words. One
of the main drawbacks of RNNs is dealing with long-term
dependencies connected with transferring information from
earlier to later times steps across too long sequences. To tackle
this issue, two more sophisticated variants of RNNs have been
introduced: LSTM and GRU.
Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM): It is a special RNN
architecture [78] conceived to learn long-term dependencies,
namely, to store information for a long period of time. Basi-
cally, an LSTM unit (replacing an ordinary node in the hidden
layer) is represented by a cell state in charge of carrying the
information, and by three different gates aimed at regulating
the information flow: forget, input, and output gates. The forget
gate decides what information keep or discard on the basis of
a forgetting coefficient calculated by input data x(t) and the
previous hidden state h(t − 1); the input gate decides how to
update the cell state; the output gate decides which information
has to be passed to the next unit, on the basis of input data and
the previous hidden state. For the i-th LSTM unit, the hidden
state at time t can be expressed as:
hi(t) = outi(t) · tanh(ci(t)), (5)
where outi(t) is an output gate which tunes the amount of
memory, and ci(t) represents the cell state of LSTM unit i at
time t.
Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU): It is a lightweight version
of LSTM [79] and has only two gates: update gate and reset
gate. The former plays a similar role of forget and input gates
of LSTM; the latter is exploited to decide how many past
data to forget. In the GRU model, the hidden state hi(t),
corresponding to the i-th GRU unit, can be expressed as a
linear interpolation between the hidden state at time t − 1 and
the candidate activation (or hidden state) h˜i(t) viz.
hi(t) = (1 − zi(t))hi(t − 1) + zi(t)h˜i(t), (6)
where zi(t) is the update gate which decides about the updating
amount of its candidate activation.
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Fig. 2: Model of a single class discriminator for the WiSARD
algorithm.
C. WiSARD
WiSARD1 is a supervised method [80], [81] that was origi-
nally conceived for image classification, but has recently been
proven to be effective in more general multi-class problems.
WiSARD falls under the class of weightless neural networks
(WNNs) since it exploits lookup tables, instead of weights,
to store the functions evaluated by the individual neurons.
WNNs rely on a mechanism inspired to the random access
memory (RAM) encoding functionalities, since input data are
transformed into binary. This process has a noteworthy benefit
in terms of time complexity due to the use of Boolean logic,
which can be further improved by exploiting pipelining and
parallelism. In short, WiSARD is composed of a set of classi-
fiers (or discriminators), each one in charge of learning binary
patterns associated to a particular class. In turn, a discriminator
is composed of a set of neurons, referred to as RAM neurons
as depicted in Fig. 2. Similarly to conventional RAM circuits,
a RAM neuron (a.k.a. n-tuple neuron) can be interpreted as
a RAM having 2n memory locations addressed by n address
lines (inputs) representative of neuron connectivity.
During the training stage, each RAM neuron learns the oc-
currences of n-tuple vectors extracted from a training pattern,
and stores them in a memory cell (equivalent to a RAM writing
1Wilkes, Stonham and Aleksander Recognition Device
6operation). Precisely, given µa,i the memory cell with address
a in the i-th RAM (initially empty), the following update rule
holds:
µa,i = θ
©­«
∑
p∈P
δa,ai (p)
ª®¬ , (7)
where: function θ(z) amounts to z if 0 ≤ z ≤ 1 and to 1 if
z > 1; p is a pattern defined in the training set P; ai(p) is the
address generated starting from pattern p; δ is the Kronecker
delta function, amounting to 1 if a = ai(p) and 0 elsewhere.
The classification stage (equivalent to a RAM reading oper-
ation) consists of classifying an unseen pattern s by assigning
s to a class c, provided that the correspondent discriminator
exhibits the highest output, namely
argmax
c
(
K∑
i=1
µai (s),i
)
, (8)
whereas, the response of the c-th class discriminator on pattern
s is:
rc(s) = 1K
K∑
i=1
µai (s),i . (9)
Accordingly, since WiSARD is made of a set of discriminators,
the overall response of a set of discriminators trained on N
classes produces a response vector r(s) = [rc1 (s), . . . , rcN (s)].
D. Learning Vector Quantization
Learning Vector Quantization (LVQ) [82] directly stems
from classical Vector Quantization, a signal-approximation
method aimed at representing the input data vectors x ∈ Rn
through a finite number of codebook vectors mi ∈ Rn, i =
1, 2, . . . , k. The goal is to find the codebook vector mv that
best approximates x, usually in terms of Euclidean distance,
namely:
v = argmin
i
| |x − mi | |. (10)
The main purpose of LVQ is to define class regions (over
the input data space), each one containing a subset of a
similarly labeled codebook. Accordingly, it is possible to
pinpoint hyperplanes between neighboring codebook vectors
defining the so-called quantization regions. By assuming that
all samples of x derive from a finite set of classes Sk , the idea
is to i) assign a subset of codebook vectors to each class Sk ,
and ii) search for mv having the smallest Euclidean distance
from x. Different versions of LVQs have been introduced
in the literature with slight differences, as introduced in the
following.
1) LVQ1: Assume that x(t) is an input sample and mi(t)
contains sequential values of mi (t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ). The LVQ1
algorithm allows to find values of mi in (10) that asymptoti-
cally minimize errors, and is defined by the following set of
equations:
mv(t + 1) = mv(t) + α(t) [x(t) − mv(t)] , (11)
mi(t + 1) = mi(t), (12)
where (11) refers both for cases that x and mv belong to the
same or different classes, (12) holds for i , v, and α(t) is
the learning rate. This algorithm admits also an optimized
version (a.k.a. OLVQ1), where an individual learning rate αi is
assigned to mi , thus, basic mv(t+1) equation in (12) becomes:
mv(t + 1) = [1 − c(t)αv(t)]mv(t) + c(t)αv(t)x(t), (13)
where c(t) = +1[−1] if the classification is correct [wrong].
2) LVQ2: Differently from the standard procedure imple-
mented in LVQ1, here two codebook vectors mi and mj
(belonging to the correct and to the wrong class, respectively)
are simultaneously updated. In this case, x must fall within
a “window” defined around the hyperplanes of mi and mj .
The correspondent algorithm is defined by the following set
of equations:
mi(t + 1) = mi(t) − α(t) [x(t) − mi(t)] , (14)
mj(t + 1) = mj(t) − α(t)
[
x(t) − mj(t)
]
, (15)
where (14) holds when x and mi belong to the same class,
(15) holds when x and mi belong to different classes, and
with mi and mj being the two closest codebook vectors to x.
Moreover, x has to fall within a window of relative width w
if
min
(
ei
ej
,
ej
ei
)
> k, (16)
where ei and ej represent, respectively, the Euclidean distances
of x from mi and mj , and k = 1−w1+w .
3) LVQ3: This variant of LVQ2 admits the same set of
equations (14), (15), with the difference that the learning rate
is weighted with a parameter  , whose best values are found
empirically to lie in the [0.1-0.5] interval of values:
mh(t + 1) = mh(t) + α(t) [x(t) − mh(t)] , (17)
for k ∈ i, j if x, mi , and mj belong to the same class.
E. Self-Organizing Maps
SOM takes inspiration from a particular adaptive character-
istic that allows the human brain to empower the experience.
Specifically, given a physical stimulus (namely, the input)
which activates multiple neurons of a certain brain area in
parallel, those neurons that are more sensitive to the input
stimulus will go about influencing all other neighboring neu-
rons.
This biological mechanism has led to designing SOM as
a nonlinear mapping of high-dimensional input data onto
elements of a low-dimensional array (a.k.a. lattice) [83],
according to a principle known as competitive learning. This is
different from the classic ANN-based approach, where weights
are updated to iteratively minimize errors. In competitive
learning, several neurons are fed with the same input (in
parallel) and compete to become the possible “winner” in
relation to that particular input.
According to this strategy, and assuming that the weight
vector of neurons has the same dimensionality as the input,
the output neuron activation increases with larger similarity
between the weight vector of the neuron and the input [84].
7Precisely, by considering a network composed of k neurons
(with k << n being n the data set size), an input vector
x = [x1, x2, . . . , xn]T ∈ Rn and a reference (or weight) vector
mi = [mi1,mi2, . . . ,min]T ∈ Rn associated with neuron i, the
competitive approach can be summarized according to the
following steps:
i) Compute the smallest Euclidean distance d = argmini
| | x − mi | | ∀i ∈ (1, . . . ,m) having the meaning of the
activation value for the i-th neuron. The neuron having d
is declared as winner.
ii) The i-th neuron is updated according to the following
rule: mi(t + 1) = mi(t)h(t) [x(t) − mi(t)] where t =
(0, 1, . . . ) is an integer discrete time reference, whereas
h(t) is the neighborhood function defined over the lattice
points that is typically implemented through a Gaussian
kernel (the same as then one exploited for the present
experimental analysis):
h(t) = α(t) · exp
(
− ||`c − `i | |
2
2σ2(t)
)
, (18)
where: α(t) is the learning rate factor, `c ∈ R2 and `i ∈
R2 are, respectively, the location vectors of neurons c
and i mapped on the lattice structure (supposed to be
bi-dimensional), and σ(t) represents the kernel width.
Although SOM may be considered as the unsupervised coun-
terpart version of LVQ, a common way to exploit SOM for
classification purposes is to consider a supervised version
(sometimes dubbed as LVQ-SOM [83] and implemented in
our analysis) relying on the following consideration: once
we know that each training sample x(t) and mi(t) have been
assigned to specific classes, h(t) has to be set to positive if
x(t) and mi(t) belong to the same class, and negative if they
belong to different classes, by taking into account that such
a rule is applied for each mi(t) in the neighborhood of the
winner.
IV. THE EXPERIMENTAL DATASETS
In this section we present further details about datasets
employed in our experimental analysis. As already remarked
in Section II, the datasets must convey the most recent infor-
mation about a variety of cyber attacks across data networks.
We adopted datasets released from CIC [52], and precisely: the
DDoS dataset, containing traffic relating to distributed denial
of service attacks designed to saturate network resources; the
Portscan dataset, including attempts of Portscan, a technique
used to discover open ports on network devices; the WebAttack
dataset which encompasses various malicious traffic ranging
from Cross-Site Scripting to Sql Injection; the TOR dataset,
a collection of network traffic traversing the anonymous TOR
circuit often conveying malicious information; and the Android
dataset, embedding a number of mobile (Android-based) ad-
wares.
These datasets have been used to perform two kinds of
neural-based analyses: a single-class analysis, aimed at clas-
sifying the network traffic as benign or malign (binary infor-
mation); and a multi-class analysis, aimed at distinguishing
more classes of attacks. Each dataset has been cleaned and
TABLE II: Synthetic description of adopted features
Family List of features
Coarse-Grained
1. Source IP Address
2. Destination IP Address
3. Source Port
4. Destination Port
5. Transport Protocol Type
Time-Based
6. Flow duration
7. Average inter-arrival times (IAT) between two flows
8. IAT standard deviation (std) between two flows
9. IAT max between two flows
10. IAT min between two flows
11. IAT tot between two pkts sent in fwd direction
12. IAT avg between two pkts sent in fwd direction
13. IAT std between two pkts sent in fwd direction
14. IAT max between two pkts sent in fwd direction
15. IAT min between two pkts sent in fwd direction
16. IAT tot between two pkts sent in bwd direction
17. IAT avg between two pkts sent in bwd direction
18. IAT std between two pkts sent in bwd direction
19. IAT max between two pkts sent in bwd direction
20. IAT min between two pkts sent in bwd direction
21. Avg time a flow was active before becoming idle
22. Std time a flow was active before becoming idle
23. Min time a flow was active before becoming idle
24. Max time a flow was active before becoming idle
25. Avg time a flow was idle before becoming active
26. Std time a flow was idle before becoming active
27. Min time a flow was idle before becoming active
28. Max time a flow was idle before becoming active
Flow-Based
29. Flow byte rate
30. Flow pkt rate
31. Avg no. of pkts in a sub-flow in fwd direction
32. Avg no. of pkts in a sub-flow in bwd direction
33. Avg no. of bytes in a sub-flow in fwd direction
34. Avg no. of bytes in a sub-flow in bwd direction
Packet-Based
35. Tot pkts in the fwd direction
36. Tot length of pkts in the fwd direction
37. Avg length of pkts
38. Std length of pkts
39. Variance length of pkts
40. Avg length of pkts in the fwd direction
41. Std length of pkts in the fwd direction
42. Max length of pkts in the fwd direction
43. Min length of pkts in the fwd direction
44. Tot pkts in the bwd direction
45. Tot length of pkts in the bwd direction
46. Avg length of pkts in the bwd direction
47. Std length of pkts in the bwd direction
48. Max length of pkts in the bwd direction
49. Min length of pkts in the bwd direction
50. Avg no. of pkt bulk rate in fwd direction
51. Avg no. of pkt bulk rate in bwd direction
52. Fwd pkt rate
53. Bwd pkt rate
54. Min segment size in fwd direction
Byte-Based
55. Avg no. of byte rate in fwd direction
56. Avg no. of byte rate in bwd direction
57. No. of bytes sent in init win in fwd direction
58. No. of bytes sent in init win in bwd direction
59. Tot bytes used for headers in fwd direction
60. Tot bytes used for headers in bwd direction
Flag-Based
61. No. of times URG flag set in fwd direction
62. No. of times PSH flag set in fwd direction
63. No. of times FIN flag set in fwd direction
64. No. of times SYN flag set in fwd direction
65. No. of times RST flag set in fwd direction
66. No. of times ACK flag set in fwd direction
67. No. of times URG flag set in bwd direction
68. No. of times PSH flag set in bwd direction
69. No. of times FIN flag set in bwd direction
70. No. of times SYN flag set in bwd direction
71. No. of times RST flag set in bwd direction
72. No. of times ACK flag set in bwd direction
73. PSH flag count
74. FIN flag count
75. SYN flag count
76. RST flag count
77. ACK flag count
78. ECE flag count
8TABLE III: Optimized hyperparameters for the exploited algorithms.
Algorithm Optimized hyperparameters and models info
MLP-1, Deep-2,
Deep-3
· Stochastic Gradient Descent with adaptive hyperparams.
(Adam version - [85])
· LR (learn. rate)=0.001
· Number of weights=2000
· Exp. Decay (first moment estimate)=0.9
· ReLU activation function
· Neurons per hidden layer: MLP-1(26); Deep-2(23,10); Deep-
3(20,16,11)
Convolutional · 7 filters (4x1), 8 neurons fully connected
· 1 Pooling layer with Pooling size = 2
· 1 Dropout layer with Dropout rate = 0.3
· ReLU activation function
Recurrent-type · 18 Recurrent units (RNN), 10 neurons fully connected
· 6 LSTM units, 8 neurons fully connected
· 8 GRU units, 10 neurons fully connected
WiSARD · Batch Size=100
· Resolution (in bit) per neuron: 8
LVQ(1,2,3) · Batch Size=100
· LR=0.3
· Codebook Vectors=20
· Window Size (for LVQ2 and LVQ3)=0.3
·  (for LVQ3)=0.1
SOM · Batch Size=100
· LR=0.3
· Hexagonal Topology with Neighborhood Size = 8
· Neighborhood Function: Gaussian
re-balanced through a Python routine designed from scratch,
and contains 2 · 104 instances and 78 features, which are then
grouped in 6 macro-classes, as indicated in the following (refer
to the Table II for an exhaustive list of features):
• Coarse-grained features: Source and Destination Port,
Protocol Type, Source and Destination IP Address;
• Time-based features: Backward/Forward inter-arrival
times between two flows, duration of active flow (mean,
std, min, max), duration of an idle flow (mean, std, min,
max), etc.;
• Flow-based features: Length of a flow (mean, min, max,
etc.);
• Packet-based features: Backward/Forward number of
packets in a flow, Backward/Forward length of packets
in a flow (mean, std, min, max, etc.);
• Byte-based features: Backward/Forward number of
bytes in a flow, Backward/Forward number of bytes used
for headers, etc.;
• Flag-based features: Number of packets with active
TCP/IP flags (SYN, FIN, PUSH, RST, URG, etc.). Please
note that, for example, feature 62 (68) indicates the no.
of times the PSH flag is set in the forward (backward)
direction, whereas feature 73 indicates the overall number
of packets containing such a flag.
These features allow to derive statistical information that
cannot be hidden in a possible malicious flow. Let us consider,
for instance, a DDoS attack. This is typically designed to
overwhelm the resources of a target network [86], [87] by
conveying legitimate information (e.g. trivial HTTP requests
in case of an application-layer DDoS attack) which would
pass unnoticed to a classic signature-based detection systems.
However, DDoS attacks are designed to be a coordinated
effort where multiple, malicious entities (a.k.a. bots) send
few, tiny packets to the target. Similarly, the structure of a
Portscan attack, characterized by a very quick scan of the
victim’s destination port by the network attacker, can be
learned by crossing information of destination port and time-
based information.
V. EXPERIMENTAL-BASED ASSESSMENT
The main purpose of our experimental analysis is to com-
pare the neural techniques introduced in Sect. III across the
datasets described in Section IV. Aimed at a fair comparison,
we adopt a 10-fold cross validation for each experiment.
The model structure for each algorithm and the pertinent
hyperparameters are summarized in Table III.
The whole assessment comprises:
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Fig. 3: Performance in terms of Accuracy/F-Measure for different single-class datasets: (a) DDoS; (b) Portscan, (c) WebAttack,
(d) TOR.
• Performance analysis: obtained by evaluating two met-
rics typically used in the field of traffic classification [88],
[89], viz.
- Accuracy : ratio of correctly predicted observations to
the total, calculated by
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
; (19)
- F-Measure : an indicator of a per-class performance,
calculated by
2 · Precision · Recall
Precision + Recall
, (20)
where Precision is the ratio of correctly classified traffic
over the total predicted traffic in a class, and Recall is the
ratio of correctly classified traffic over all ground truth
traffic in a class.
• Time complexity analysis: derived by measuring the
whole classification process (including training time) as
the number of instances grows from 103 to 2 · 104.
We perform the overall analysis on a PC equipped with
Intel CoreTM i5-7200U CPU@ 2.50GHz CPU and 16 GB of
RAM. For the sake of convenience, we split our analysis in
two: the single-class and the multi-class cases.
A. Single-Class Analysis
We start by evaluating the performance of the differ-
ent neural-based techniques by considering four single-class
datasets (DDoS, Portscan, WebAttack, and TOR), reporting
accuracy and F-measure in Figures 3(a), 3(b), 3(c), and 3(d),
respectively. The choice of four completely different datasets
(representative of four substantially different network attacks)
is useful to verify the effectiveness of the tested algorithms
and their relationships with the data.
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Fig. 4: Single-class (DDoS): (a) Average Accuracy vs. dataset size; (b) Classification Time vs. dataset size; Single-class
(Portscan): (c) Average Accuracy vs. dataset size; (d) Classification Time vs. dataset size.
Among classic ANN-based algorithms we distinguish be-
tween deep versions (Deep-2, Deep-3) and non-deep ones
(MLP-1) whose detailed structure is reported in Table III.
MLP-1 refers to a standard MLP with 3 layers: 1 input layer,
1 hidden layer, and 1 output layer. On the other hand, deep
versions are indicated by Deep-2 (1 input layer, 2 hidden
layer, 1 output layer) and Deep-3 (1 input layer, 3 hidden
layer, 1 output layer). In order to compare algorithms with
similar performances, MLP-1, Deep-2 and Deep-3 have been
set with the same number of weights (2k). This is about one
order of magnitude smaller than the dataset size, according
to what is recommended in the literature [90], [91]. We also
note that the number of weights for MLP-1, Deep-2 and Deep-
3 directly results from the different number of neurons chosen
per each hidden layer, namely: 26 neurons for MLP-1, 23 and
10 neurons for the two hidden layers of Deep-2, and 20, 16,
and 11 neurons for the 3 hidden layers of Deep-3 (see also
Table III). As concerns the evolved deep models (CNN, RNN,
LSTM, GRU), details about their structures are available in
Table III. Also for these approaches, the choice of a particular
structure (e.g. the number of filters in CNN, the number of
recurrent units in RNN, and so forth), is aimed at obtaining
a number of weights comparable with MLP-1, Deep-2, and
Deep-3 so to have a fair comparison.
In our analysis, the MLP-based versions (MLP-1, Deep-2
and Deep-3) and the evolved deep techniques (CNN, RNN,
LSTM, GRU) exhibit good values of average accuracy (all
around 0.99) for all the four examined datasets (panels of Fig.
3). Similarly, for all the aforementioned algorithms and for
each dataset, F-measure exhibits high values, indicating a very
negligible fraction of false positives and false negatives. Simi-
lar high performance is exhibited by Wisard for all the datasets
with a slight exception of Portscan Dataset. By contrast, LVQs
and SOM methodologies have lower performance and seem
to suffer from the presence of more false positives and false
negatives. This is visible for the Portscan dataset (Fig. 3(b))
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that exhibits an oscillating F-measure, which can be ascribed
to the different codebook vectors obtained when considering
different input datasets. In particular, competitive learning
methods seem suffer from the particular type of attack dataset.
In fact, the Euclidean distance (which is used as the main
metric within the discussed competitive learning approaches)
may not perfectly capture the properties of various datasets,
being they structurally different. This is due to the fact that
Euclidean distance is a not scale invariant measure, thus, it
has difficulty to deal with vector components having different
dynamic range. This is also the reason why the 3 variants of
LVQ can behave slightly differently when considering diverse
datasets.
Another useful analysis is aimed at evaluating the impact
of dataset size on performance. For the sake of compactness,
we choose DDoS and Portscan as benchmark datasets, being
DDoS and Portscan representative of two completely different
and well structured network attacks. Precisely, we evaluate the
average accuracy (between DDoS/Portscan and benign classes)
against an interval of dataset size varying between 103 and
2 · 104 instances. The results shown in Figures 4(a) and 4(c)
provide a clear indication that: i) both ANNs and WiSARD
exhibit very stable performance as dataset size varies; ii) LVQ
shows some minor fluctuations, with an average accuracy that
is just slightly under 0.9 in few cases. In this case, fluctuations
can be ascribed to the codebook size that would require
heuristical adjustments as the dataset size varies.
For the sake of fairness, the performance comparison must
be complemented by a time-complexity analysis, as shown in
Figs. 4(b-d). Therein, classification time (in seconds) is plotted
against the number of instances (from 103 to 2 ·104). For both
experiments (DDoS dataset in 4(b) and Portscan dataset in 4
(d)) we can reasonably recognize three slots in the Y axis: the
first one, ranging from 103 to 15 · 104 seconds, where MLP-1,
Deep-2, 3 and evolved deep architectures (CNN, RNN, LSTM,
GRU) operate (slowest algorithms); the second one, ranging
from about 10 to 102 seconds which includes WiSARD
(medium-fast algorithm); the third one, ranging from about 1
to 5 seconds, including LVQ1, LVQ2, LVQ3, and SOM (faster
algorithms).
We are not surprised that deep networks are up to 2 orders
of magnitude slower w.r.t. other techniques, due to the fully
connected neurons between each layer. As regards the evolved
deep architectures, time complexity is typically associated to
the adoption of more sophisticated structures such as the
convolutional layers (CNNs), or mechanisms to retain the
internal memory states (RNN, LSTM, GRU).
On the other hand, approaches based on competitive learn-
ing (LVQs, SOM) are faster since only the winner neurons
are enabled to update their weights, although this comes at
the cost of a lower accuracy. Surprisingly, the best trade-off
between accuracy and time complexity is offered by WiSARD.
Its RAM-based structure, in fact, allows a fast learning stage
since it deals with binary information regardless on data
dimension. In terms of time complexity, the feed-forward
incremental learning scheme implemented in WiSARD is more
advantageous than classic backpropagation, requiring many
iterations to converge.
B. Multi-Class Analysis
Multi-class analysis is useful to analyze how the various
algorithms react when dealing with different classes of traffic.
With this aim, we built a 4-class dataset by mixing (in
a balanced way) three malicious classes (DDoS, Portscan,
and Adware) with a Benign class. The rationale behind this
choice is to take into account a mix of peculiar threats. As
regards the performance analysis, for the sake of readiness,
we show multi-class accuracy and F-measure separately in
Figs. 5(a) and 5(b), respectively. As a general trend, we
observe a satisfactory classification performance by MLP
and Deep algorithms. WiSARD exhibits good performance in
classifying DDoS and Portscan (0.9957 and 0.9952 accuracy,
respectively), but is poor in classifying Adware and Benign
classes (0.784 and 0.782 accuracy, respectively). The reason
is to be found behind the structural difference between those
different types of attacks. DDoS and Portscan are both highly
“structured” attacks. The former can be characterized in terms
of high rate of messages that a bot sends to a victim; Portscan
hides continuous ping-based requests towards a target in order
to unveil possible open ports. By contrast, Adwares can be
easily confused within a benign flow, since they just convey
annoying banners, as often occurs also within legitimate web
portals. The situation changes drastically when we look at the
remaining algorithms (LVQs and SOM), where false positives
have high weight especially for Portscan, Adware, and Benign
classes, as shown in Fig. 5(b). Also, the F-measure is often
below 0.4 in case of Adware and Benign classes. With
respect to the single-class case, here, the effects produced by
the codebook class assignment and peculiarity of Euclidean
measure are amplified.
Finally, among competitive-based approaches, LVQ-3 ex-
hibits the best performance, due to the introduction of the
empirical parameter  (see Sect. III-D3), which helps to better
regulating the distance between the data and the pertinent
codebook vectors. This notwithstanding, all the considered
techniques exhibit fairly stable accuracy averages, across the
whole range of dataset sizes (from 103 to 2 · 104 instances),
as revealed by Fig. 6(a). As expected, the average accuracy
in all cases pertaining the multi-class experiment is slightly
lower than their single-class counterpart, due to the fact that
classifying more than two classes is a more challenging task.
Let us now discover if the multi-class analysis has an
impact on the time complexity of the considered algo-
rithms. Figure 6(b) shows how the order of magnitude in
classification times per algorithm is similar w.r.t. the case
of single-class analysis. As to be expected, the slight in-
crease in classification time going from single to multi-class
cases can be ascribed to the higher number of different
traffic flows to be classified. For example, along the vary-
ing dataset size
[
103, 2 · 103, 5 · 103, 104, 2 · 104] , WiSARD
exhibits the following (approximated) classification times:
[8.047, 12.24, 30.731, 53.474, 104.783] seconds in the single
class case, and [8.389, 15.058, 31.831, 61.958, 119.848] sec-
onds in the multi-class case. Once again, WiSARD appears
to provide the optimal trade-off between performance needs
and time complexity issues.
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Fig. 5: Performance analysis for a 4-classes dataset: (a) Accuracy, (b) F-Measure.
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Fig. 6: Multi-class dataset: (a) Average Accuracy vs. dataset size;
(b) Classification Time vs. dataset size.
C. General Considerations
A number of interesting considerations may be derived from
our comparative analysis. First, not all neural-based techniques
are equally applicable to network intrusion detection, particu-
larly when performance is the key issue.
ANN approaches (including modern deep-based methods)
tend to offer noteworthy accuracy, both in single-class and
multi-class datasets. Unfortunately, though, accuracy comes at
the expenses of time complexity, which will demand for deep-
based techniques to rely on specialized GPU-based hardware.
Moreover, as an auxiliary investigation pertaining the deep
approach, we evaluate the impact of the updating weight
mechanism on the overall performance, expressed through
the Mean Square Error (MSE). The behavior is shown in
Figs. 7(a) and 7(b) for the single and multi-class datasets,
respectively, evaluated over 100 epochs. Such analysis reveals
that most techniques exhibit limited fluctuations around the
median value of MSE and a quite low MSE value. The
only exception is given by CNN where the higher MSE is
reasonably due to the complexity of the convolution operation.
Similar considerations raised in a bio-informatic study [92]
where only MLP and CNN techniques have been compared.
Detailed values are reported in Table IV, in terms of median
and inter-quartile range (difference between third and first
quartile) values. On average, the most “stable” techniques are
the classic Deep-2 and Deep-3 architectures. The addition of
a bit more sophisticated structure (e.g. convolutional layer for
CNN, LSTM/GRU units, and so forth) can translate into MSE
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Fig. 7: MSE analysis when introducing more sophisticated deep models (CNN, RNN, LSTM, GRU). Single-class (DDoS
benchmark dataset) (a), Multi-class (DDoS-Portscan-Adware-Benign dataset) (b).
fluctuations due to the presence of additional hyperparameters
to tune. Obviously, such fluctuations directly reflect the inter-
nal structure of each deep technique and can be more (e.g.
CNN) or less (e.g. RNN) pronounced.
TABLE IV: Median and IQR values (MSE analysis) for deep-
based techniques
Median IQR
Technique Single-Class Multi-Class Single-Class Multi-Class
Deep-2 1.5· 10−3 2.02 · 10−2 1.8· 10−3 7 · 10−3
Deep-3 7.4· 10−4 1.45 · 10−2 1.6· 10−3 6.1· 10−3
CNN 1.74 · 10−2 6.2 · 10−2 4.1· 10−3 1.19· 10−2
RNN 1.4 · 10−3 2.06 · 10−2 2.1· 10−3 6.6· 10−3
LSTM 1.8 · 10−3 3.02 · 10−2 2.9· 10−3 6.7 · 10−3
GRU 2.4 · 10−3 2.45 · 10−2 2· 10−3 8.1 · 10−3
Remarkably, deep-learning techniques could find interesting
application in the network intrusion management field when
the training set exhibits slow time dynamics. In this case, the
training operation (being time/resource consuming) could be
performed only once (or performed rarely across the time).
As regards competitive learning techniques (LVQ in the 3
variants and SOM), pros and cons are (almost) reversed w.r.t.
ANN algorithms. In the case of single-class analysis, a depen-
dency on the type of dataset is highlighted (better performance
in DDoS dataset than in Portscan). This is reasonably due to
the fact that different inputs produce different mappings with
codebook vectors. As to be expected, this effect is further
amplified in multi-class datasets, where false positives and
false negatives lead to unstable f-measure figures (Fig. 5 (b)).
However, the competitive learning algorithms exhibit very
appealing time complexity figures (up to 3 orders of magnitude
lower than ANNs), thanks to their approach to taking into
account only the “winner” neurons during the whole classifi-
cation process. Accordingly, cooperative techniques could find
useful application in highly time-variant intrusion detection
settings, where it is crucial to quickly adapt to the dataset
variations. Possibly, they can operate an early (even rough)
detection to be refined later by means of other algorithms.
Finally, an unexpected finding is offered by WiSARD that,
through its weightless mechanism, provides the best trade-
off between performance (accuracy/F-measure) and time com-
plexity, in both single and multi-class cases. This outstanding
behavior is mainly due to two aspects: first, the binariza-
tion scheme (jointly with the RAM-like neurons structure)
adopted by WiSARD allows to handle multivariable data in
a fast way. Then, the training stage follows an incremental
approach since each sample reinforces the past knowledge in
updating the network state; this implies a fast convergence
and makes WiSARD particularly suitable in domains where
online learning is crucial. What is even more interesting is
that WiSARD has hardly ever been considered in the field
of traffic flow classification, while it appears to be a very
interesting candidate to be exploited in intrusion detection.
This WNN-based approach should certainly be considered as
a promising alternative to existing methods, particularly for
its potential to meet the near-real-time constraints involved in
NIDS classification problems.
VI. CONCLUSION
This work explores the applicability of prominent neural-
based techniques in network intrusion detection. We carry out
an experiment-based comparison to quantify performance and
trade-off achievable with each solution. Our aim to perform
a fair comparison has directed our investigation to focus
on artificial neural networks (ANN). This was to avoid the
typical issues arising when comparing ML methods relying on
different rationale (e.g. ANN vs. SVM vs. Decision Trees).
In the related work section, we have provided pointers to
numerous other surveys, illustrating similarities (in aims) and
14
differences (in methodologies). The key peculiarity of our pa-
per is its experimental-based approach to reviewing alternative
ANN options. We based our evaluation on modern datasets
(CIC-IDS-2017/2018), while most of the earlier experimental
results are based on the outdated KDD99 dataset (reflecting
network attack issues that have largely been solved). Our
review provides useful performance (in terms of accuracy
and F-measure) and time complexity data, providing the basis
for a trade-off analysis across different ANNs such as deep
networks or competitive learning-based networks. To add value
to our study, we wanted to consider also methods that have
not typically been employed in intrusion detection, particularly
the weightless neural networks (WNNs).
The outcomes reveal a number of interesting findings. i)
ANN-based approaches (including deep networks) are charac-
terized by outstanding performance in almost all cases (as to be
expected). Yet, they suffer the drawback of being slow due to
the underlying backpropagation algorithm, which is typically
slow to converge. ii) Neural-based techniques relying on a
competitive learning approach (LVQ1, LVQ2, LVQ3, SOM)
overturn this perspective, thanks to a much reduced time com-
plexity (due to the winner-neuron mechanism). However, this
comes with a lower performance when different datasets are
considered (due to the different mapping mechanism between
input and codebook vectors). iii) The WiSARD algorithm
(representative of WNNs) exhibits a surprisingly best trade-
off in terms of performance and time complexity, making it
an appealing candidate to operate in conjunction with intrusion
detection systems.
The proposed analysis could be extended in several ways.
The first (and perhaps natural) direction is to better investigate
the potential of weightless neural networks in the context of
network intrusion detection. Beyond WiSARD, in fact, other
WNN algorithms such as Probabilistic Logic Node (PLN),
Goal Seeking Neuron (GSN), or General Neural Unit (GNU)
could reveal noteworthy properties when applied in this field.
Then, we would suggest to explore how the addition of a
feature selection (FS) pre-processing stage would reduce time
complexity. This could be particularly advantageous for deep
techniques (the most critical in terms of time constraints),
even if the adoption of a non well designed FS strategy
could result in a further computational overhead. Finally,
having identified pros and cons of neural-based techniques
in the field of intrusion detection, an engine which allows
to automatically select (or combine) the NN-based strategies
best fitting the underlying network environment (e.g. hugely
vs. scarcely time-variant traffic profiles) can be designed. This
latter point could have intriguing implications onto prospective
6G scenarios which, according to the network experts, will
be characterized by automatic service provisioning, intelligent
resource management, and smart network adjustments.
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